Wednesday 19 September 2007

Red Tape

A country which in the hands of terrorists witnessed over 70,000 deaths, where nearly 11,000 security personnel - more than in all the wars fought by it - have been killed by terrorists, where half a million people continue to remain as refugees in their own country for over decade-and-a-half, and where over 24,500 foreign mercenaries have come to bleed India from its neighbouring countries should have chjanged its security systems and apparatus unrecognizably.

What is tragic is the
fact that, barring some cosmetic changes, we continue to be governed by the same laws, same change-resisting bureaucratic procedures, same misplcaed priorities where internal security is a low priority item in the budget, same selection procedures laced by corruption and caste politics, and same training which was designed to keep control masters in power. We take the losses in our stride - nobody's blood boils and nothing changes. The US face done lethal strike and everything changed overnight - their laws, instrumentality to fight terrorism - brand new Department of Homeland Security surfacing from nowhere, their foreign policy, immigration processes and access control, intelligence transformation just to name a few. Not that their system is perfect but it shows their cpacity to change fast and take the changes to the operating levels. No wonder September 11 was not repeated. The secret of success lies in lowering our tolerance threshold for all that which fails to deliver, changing fast and cinstantly, and taking the changes to the last beat constable on the road.

The worst is yet to come. What is happening all around us in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Nepal and more imprtantly within have securityt implications and is indicative of testing times. Taking changes to micro levelsis time consuming and painstaking effort, pariticularly diverse internal security apparatus like India's, involving nearly 20 million people. The time to act is here and now. Let the doctrine of time-tested methods be relegated to the dustbin of history - it is only supported by those who have either a vested interest in status quo or insecurity due to incompetence. An attempt was made in 2001, first time after Independance, to bring about an integrated transformation in national security apparatus and systems encompassing internal secuity, intelligence, border management and defence. The first three of them had direct relevance to the fight against terrorism. With passage of time, much of the enthusiasm for change has withered away. The Prevention Of Terrorism Act (POTA) stands repealed and the recommendations of Malimath Commission suggesting overhaul of judicial administrative system shelved. The entire legal and judicial framework under which terrorism should be tackled needs to be revisited and a national consensus built to make it compatible with the level of threat, existing and potential. Politicizing the matter is against national interest.A multipurpose national identity card scheme, after amendments in Citizenship Act 1955 in December, 2003 was pressed into action and a pilot project launched. It envisaged providing national identity cards to all above 16 and link it o birth details, school records, passport details, driving license, foreign travels besides bio-metric recognitions, etc. Its opposition by some sections for reasons other than national interest is understandable though not acceptable, but the government wilting undertheir pressure and practically showing no progress in three years is unforgivable. It could have provided a data bank to fight terrorism.

Fight against terrorism is essentially a foot soldier's battle
and not the general's battle. It requires training, equipping, empowering, motivating and coordinating people at the cutting edge levels. A counter-terrorist operation rarely requires planning, resource mobilisation and tactics involving large bodies of men and material. Real improvement in training requires a state-of-the-art R&D backup involving research in tactics, communications, control and command systems, target zeroing, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, procurement, storage and distribution of weapons, operation of financial channels etc., just to name a few. Unless a R&D team constantly works on analysing each event, examining the seized documents, interrogating the terroists, case studying failed and successful operations training is an eyewash. It's a pity that nearly 90% of those who are deployed on counter terrorist tasks have not even undergone this ritual - non-availability of funds and training facilities cited as the primary cause. The infirmity must be cured under a time bound programme, whatever the costs. It is a fallacious presumption that in an asymmetric warfare the stronger nation has no option other than to respond in a defensive mode. Defensive offence is necessary to increase the costs for the adversaries. A message to those who would like to pursue the strategy of thousand cuts to bleed India, for furthering their objectives, has got to be given.

The complex network that webs global Islamic radicalism, proponents of Salafi ideology, terrorist outfits, gun runners, hawal racketeers, underworld mafias, currency counterfeiters, drug syndicates etc. should be seen as an organic whole and dealt under an integrated action plan. Degradation of one reduces the efficacy of others and vice versa. Empowerment of center to take cognizance of these crime, which impact national security, is an absolute necessity.

The magic word is change - positive, fast and reaching out to the
lowest on the ladder. This, however, will require a political will. Do we have it?

Excerpts from Ajit Doval's TOI article

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